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Summary
This report assesses the impact of the September 11, 2001 attacks on public and
private information infrastructures in the context of critical infrastructure protection,
continuity of operations (COOP) planning, and homeland security.  Analysis of the
effects of the terrorist attacks suggests various “lessons learned.”  These lessons
support three general principles.  The first principle emphasizes the establishment
and practice of comprehensive continuity and recovery plans.  One lesson learned in
this area is to augment disaster recovery plans.  Businesses and agencies, who now
must consider the possibility of complete destruction and loss of a building, may
need to augment their disaster recovery plans to include the movement of people, the
rapid acquisition of equipment and furniture, network connectivity, adequate
workspace, and more.  A corollary to this lesson learned is the need to assure that
recovery procedures are well documented and safeguarded so that they can be fully
utilized when necessary.  A second lesson is the need to back up data and
applications.  Without a comprehensive backup system that captures more than just
an organization’s data files, a significant amount of time can be lost trying to re-
create applications, organize data, and reestablish user access.  A corollary to this
lesson learned is the need to fully and regularly test backup sites and media to ensure
their reliability and functionality.  
The second principle focuses on the decentralization of operations and the
effectiveness of distributed communications.  The lesson of decentralizing
operations can be applied to the structure and location of an organization’s
operations.  Industry experts suggest recovery sites be located at least 20-50 miles
away form the primary work site.  In addition, some observers suggest that human
resources should also be located in more than one place to reduce the potential for
losing a significant portion of one’s workforce in a single event.  Another lesson in
this area is to ensure the ability to communicate with internal and external
constituencies.  In the event of an emergency, the demand for information skyrockets.
An organization not only needs to communicate with employees regarding actions
and procedures, but also with the citizens and customers to whom it is responsible
for providing goods and services.  
The third principle involves the institutionalization of system redundancies to
eliminate single points of weakness.  In this context, the lesson of employing
redundant service providers is applied primarily to telecommunications services.  In
the event a central switching station is disabled, having multiple providers using
different infrastructures for access can reduce the possibility of an organization losing
its communications services and being unable to carry out its responsibilities.
Another related lesson learned is the use of generic replaceable technology.  In the
event of a catastrophe, the ability to replace equipment quickly with easy-to-find
products that do not require comprehensive  customization, can contribute
significantly to how quickly an organization’s operations can be functional again. 
This report will be updated as events recommend.
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1H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, has served as the primary legislative proposal
being considered in the House of Representatives regarding the creation of a new
Department of Homeland Security.  H.R. 4660, National Homeland Security and Combating
Terrorism Act of 2002 is the House counterpart to S. 2452.
2S. 2452, National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002, has served
as the primary legislative proposal being considered in the Senate regarding the creation of
a new Department of Homeland Security.
3For a detailed analysis of the proposals to create a new Department of Homeland Security,
see CRS Report RL31513 Homeland Security: Side-by-Side Comparison of H.R. 5005 and
S. 2452, 107th Congress, by the CRS Homeland Security Team, and CRS Report RL31493
Homeland Security: Department Organization and Management, by Harold C. Relyea.
4See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index.html].
Homeland Security – Reducing the
Vulnerability of Public and Private 
Information Infrastructures
 to Terrorism: An Overview
Introduction
Analysis of the effects of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, suggests
various “lessons learned” concerning public and private information infrastructures.
What results are some insights to the range of challenges and opportunities facing
policymakers as they seek to identify relevant technical solutions to homeland
security concerns.  This report considers these homeland security issues in the
context of critical information infrastructure protection and continuity of operations
(COOP) planning.  
As part of the congressional and presidential efforts to develop and implement
a comprehensive homeland security strategy and establish a Department of Homeland
Security, the role of information technology (IT) has become an increasingly
important focus.  In Congress, bills have been introduced and are being actively
considered in both the House of Representatives1 and the Senate2 regarding the
establishment of a new department dedicated to homeland security issues.3  Although
they differ on the details, the bills include provisions regarding the proposed
department’s organizational composition, administrative structure, and functional
responsibilities.  In July 2002, the President released the country’s first National
Strategy for Homeland Security, outlining the strategic objectives, critical mission
areas, and initiatives in support of the Administration’s proposed Department of
Homeland Security.4  The strategic objectives include: prevent terrorist attacks within
the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and minimize the
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damage and recover from attacks that do occur.  Common to both the national
strategy document and the proposed legislation is an emphasis on developing
information sharing initiatives and fostering partnerships between and within the
levels of government and the sectors of industry.  
The heavy reliance upon information technology to carry out mission critical
tasks and provide other citizen services highlights the need to ensure these assets are
protected, backed up, and resilient to attack.  Moreover, the growth of the use of
electronic government (e-government) applications to conduct government-to-citizen
interactions, as well as government-to-business and government-to-government
transactions, has put additional pressure on the need to reconstitute systems quickly
to minimize any disruptions and financial costs associated with a major infrastructure
failure.5  In addition, renewed emphasis is being placed on reducing the vulnerability
of the nation’s critical information infrastructures while more fully integrating and
utilizing public and private information technology assets.6  Taken together, these
issues demonstrate the importance of ensuring the reliability and continuity of
information technology systems, as part of the government’s overall approach to
homeland security.  The accounts of successes and failures regarding how agencies
and businesses responded to the September 11, 2001 attacks provide an unusual
opportunity to examine options for further improving the nation’s  emergency
preparedness.
Relevance and Context of the September 11, 2001 Attacks
In addition to the destruction of buildings and the loss of life, the September 11,
2001 attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) and the Pentagon inflicted heavy
damage on elements of the country’s information and communication infrastructure.
This, in turn, affected how both public and private organizations were able to respond
to the events of the day.  First responders experienced difficulties communicating
among themselves.7  Citizens and some governmental officials experienced problems
communicating by telephone due to overloaded and destroyed circuits.  As described
in the sections below, some agencies and businesses directly affected by the attacks
had difficulties recovering and reestablishing data operations due to inadequate
infrastructure and/or the lack of backup systems.  Faced with an overloaded
telecommunications system, many turned to the Internet, which continued to function
as designed, to send and receive e-mail messages regarding the safety of family,
friends, and colleagues.  However, even in areas not directly affected by the attacks,
citizens and government employees sometimes found a dearth of information because
some agencies shut down Web sites or did not use them to provide information
regarding available resources and instructions on when and where to report for work.
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For example, it was reported that as of nearly 48 hours after they occurred, neither
the General Services Administration (GSA) or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
had posted any information regarding the terrorist attacks.  It was also reported that
of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) shut down its Web site due to
concerns related to cyberterrorism.8  
It is important to note that many of the technology-related problems that
emerged from the September attacks have less to do with the capabilities of the
technology itself than with how it was implemented.  For example, phone lines can
be disrupted, so organizations with critical functions need to secure redundant, but
separate, means to communicate.  Data can be stored and sent nearly anywhere, but
agencies need to establish protocols for regularly backing up important information
to secure, remote centers. The mixed performance of information infrastructures
suggests that both the public and private sectors need to reexamine their information
planning and practices so that they can better weather and rebound from catastrophic
events. The damage sustained by two important economic and military locations,
combined with ongoing efforts to restore services and prepare contingency plans, also
raise questions regarding the federal government’s role and the private sector’s ability
to ensure the protection and continuity of the country’s information infrastructure
(e.g., telecommunications, computer networks, Internet, etc.) in the future.
Nearly a year after the attacks, many organizations are still evaluating the
strengths and weaknesses of their information technology resources in the face of
such unusual circumstances.  It is likely that the full extent of the damage to
information technology resources will not be made public due to concerns about
national security and business continuity.  Traditionally, both public and private
sector organizations have been very reluctant to reveal publicly the extent to which
their operations are affected by computer viruses and worms, hacker attacks, or
similar security weaknesses.  This reluctance to share information occurs for two
primary reasons.  The first is the interest in maintaining the confidence of
customers/constituents, and, by extension, in the case of publicly traded companies,
maintaining market value.  The second reason is concern over being identified as a
target for future attacks, and the possibility of revealing (unwittingly or not) other
vulnerabilities.  However, despite the validity of these concerns, the reluctance to
share information with the appropriate actors can serve as an impediment to recovery
and prevention planning by further embedding potential weaknesses into the
information infrastructure the country has become increasingly dependent upon. 
Despite the imperfect nature of the information available, a number of lessons
learned can be identified and are discussed below.  To place these lessons in context,
the next section provides a brief synopsis of how the public and private information
infrastructures performed and were affected in the wake of the initial destruction and
the immediate reaction by individuals, businesses, and the federal government.
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Summary of the Events and Impact of 
September 11, 2001
Overview
Due to the evolving nature of available information, it is not possible to provide
a comprehensive accounting of all the organizations affected by the terrorist attacks.
However, a variety of examples are discussed in context to provide a sense of the
range of issues facing the public and private sectors as they seek to implement new
initiatives.  One means to gain an overall sense of the immediate impact of the
September 11, 2001 attacks is to consider how people and organizations
communicated.  
The attacks spurred a tremendous spike in telephone calls that overloaded the
capacity of some networks.  Verizon normally handles 115 million calls per day in
New York City and 35 million in Washington, DC, for a normal daily total of 150
million calls.  Following the attacks, the combined total jumped to 340 million calls.
Similarly, Cingular Wireless said its call volume jumped 400%.  Requests were made
to international telecommunications carriers, such as France Telecom, to control the
flow of calls to the United States in an effort to keep trans-Atlantic links open.9
Many people turned to cellphone-based text messaging, Internet-based instant
messaging, and the use of two-way radio features of cellphones to get around the
congested phone networks.  AOL reported a 20% jump in instant messaging volume,
handling 1.2 billion messages on September 11, 2001.10  
The National Communications System (NCS) activated the Government
Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS).  Using a special phone number
and a personal identification number, GETS calls receive priority handling before all
other calls on phone lines operated by ATT, Sprint, and WorldCom.  During the
week following the attacks, 3,000 GETS calls were made in Washington.  An
additional 4,000 GETS calls to and from Manhattan were completed with a 95%
success rate.11
The General Services Administration (GSA) also provided mobile
communications centers that supported several agencies, including the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  In addition, the GSA Federal Technology Service
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(FTS) made 500 computers available to agencies within the first two days of the
attacks.12
Many agencies used their Web sites to keep the public informed and provide
information on how to help the victims.  One of those was the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) Web site.  FEMA was one of the first agencies to post
information about the attacks on the morning of September 11, 2001.  On September
12, the FEMA site had 3.4 million visitors, an all-time high for the agency.  GSA
used its site to notify people about the status of various governmental buildings.
Many agencies, including the Department of Defense, used their sites to keep
employees informed of changes.13  Some Members of Congress, including Senators
Charles Schumer and Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York, and Senator George
Allen of Virginia, also turned their congressional sites into information centers
regarding the attacks.14  
FirstGov’s Web staff, who were evacuated from their Washington, DC, offices,
worked at home immediately following the attacks, collecting information, phone
numbers, and URLs for relevant sites.  They posted this information to the FirstGov
site on September 12.  Many commercial news sites and other government sites then
posted links to the FirstGov site15, helping drive 448,552 unique visitors accounting
for 1.75 million page hits during the week of September 9-15.  FirstGov also changed
its site update schedule from every two weeks to updating it every 12 hours.16  
New York - the World Trade Center
At 8:45 AM, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the
World Trade Center.  Eighteen minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175 crashed into
the south tower.  The eventual collapse of both towers inflicted heavy damage to the
surrounding buildings and infrastructure, ultimately resulting in the collapse of other
buildings on the site and the deaths of nearly 3,000 people.  The attacks displaced
large numbers of both public and private sector employees.  The World Trade Center
contained an estimated 430 tenants with 50,000 employees (not all present at the time
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According to the General Services Administration (GSA), more than 2,800
federal employees worked in offices leased by the GSA in Buildings 6 and 7 of the
World Trade Center complex.  Building 6 had over 2,000 federal employees from a
variety of agencies, including the Customs Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (ATF), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the
Export-Import Bank, the Foreign Commercial Service of the Department of
Commerce, and the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration of the Labor
Department.18  Among the tenants of Building 7 were 760 federal employees from
agencies including the Secret Service, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), the Department of Defense, and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS).19  Another 25,000 federal employees were evacuated from four nearby
buildings; 26 Federal Plaza, 290 Broadway, 40 Centre Street, and 500 Pearl Street.20
The attacks also inflicted heavy damage on elements of the city's information
and communication infrastructure, including both land lines and wireless services.
One switching facility, which handled 40% of the lower Manhattan phone lines and
20% of the New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE) traffic, was damaged when steel
beams from a collapsing building punctured the switching station, flooding it with
water and debris. A second switching facility, which normally handles 80% of the
NYSE's 15,000 phone and data lines, did not suffer direct damage, but was rendered
inoperable by intermittent power outages.21  In addition, several wireless cell sites
were destroyed and others were rendered inactive by power outages.  Communication
between the New York Fire Department, the Emergency Medical Systems (EMS),
and the New York Police Department were also cut off due to the loss of an antenna
that had been on 1 World Trade Center.22  By January 2002, Verizon had restored
service to 99% of the affected area.23 
Local television stations were also affected.  Nearly all of the broadcasters had
their main antennas located on the roof of the north tower of the World Trade Center.
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Two stations had backup antennas on the Empire State Building, allowing their
signals to still be received by most citizens who were not wired for cable television.
The other broadcasters had to utilize towers in more distant locations, such as Alpine,
NJ, where they could only reach portions of the New York metropolitan area.  As of
late June 2002, broadcasters were continuing to work with lawmakers to try to
identify a new site for a common tower that would be located within the 3.2 mile
radius of the World Trade Center site, necessary to reach the local residents while not
interfering with broadcasts in Philadelphia or Boston.24    
Virginia - the Pentagon
At 9:38 AM, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the west face of the
Pentagon, killing 64 passengers on board and 125 additional people on the ground.
The crash and ensuing fire destroyed an estimated 10% of the Pentagon’s office
space, and reportedly disrupted one of the Pentagon’s two major communications
lines.25  The Navy lost 70% of its Pentagon offices, including a portion of the Navy’s
budget office, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and its
telecommunications operation center.26  The U.S. Army’s Information Management
Support Center also received significant damage, losing most of its desktop
computers, its entire central help desk, and apparently was unable to access its
backup tapes.27  In addition, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service was
damaged.  Computerworld magazine suggested that many of the Navy’s top-secret
network operations were probably damaged, although it was believed to be unlikely
that this affected the Navy’s ability to communicate sensitive information to Navy
vessels.28  
The attack on the Pentagon caused the loss of knowledge assets, including hard
copies and data on workstations and servers that were not duplicated or backed up
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and stored in a different physical location, according to media reports.29  It is not clear
how much information may have been permanently lost or to what degree a lack of
backed up information hampered efforts to continue the operations of the affected
offices.  One office that was able to resume its functions quickly was the Defense
Finance and Accounting Office, which maintains servers located in Ohio.30  Also, the
Navy was able to utilize its recently signed Navy Marine Corp Intranet (NMCI)
contract to assist its efforts to resume operations.  Using the NMCI contract, the Navy
relocated approximately 1,000 of its displaced personnel to temporary offices in
Arlington, VA, and had 860 laptop computers, 335 desktop computers, and 30
servers, routers, and cabling delivered and installed in just over one week.  The
Navy’s Budget Office, which was in the middle of preparing its budget that was due
October 6 when the attacks occurred, lost part of its server farm. However, it had 50
computers and its server farm restored by Sunday, September 16.31  Efforts to
reconstruct and repair the 400,000 square feet of damaged Pentagon offices, dubbed
Project Phoenix, have progressed rapidly, with the first group of people moving back
into their rebuilt offices on August 15, 2002.32
Lessons Learned
In the months following September 11, 2001, there have been a number of
accounts of successes, failures, and ‘lessons learned’ regarding continuity and
disaster recovery planning.  In many cases, these descriptions are specific to a
particular organization or business activity.  However, one can identify some
observations and lessons learned that are widely applicable and that policymakers
and business leaders may wish to consider as they develop and implement new
homeland security initiatives.  
Continuity of operations (COOP) and disaster recovery planning are not new
concepts.  However, surveys have shown that only about half of American businesses
have disaster management plans in place.  In many cases, past threats are often the
motivating influences for organizations to make these plans.  For example, Morgan
Stanley, one of the tenants in the south tower of the World Trade Center, adopted
thorough plans in response to bomb threats being made during the Persian Gulf War
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in 1991, and reinforced those plans following the 1993 bombing of the World Trade
Center.  The financial services firm’s regular evacuation drills are credited as one of
the reasons why nearly all of its approximately 3,500 employees were able to escape
before the buildings collapsed.33
In the case of information technology disaster recovery planning, preparation for
the year 2000 transition (Y2k) has been cited by a number of private and public
sector organizations as one of the main reasons they were able to respond and recover
quickly from the September 11, 2001, attacks.34  Y2k planning began substantially
in the 1990s, led primarily by the private sector and followed by federal and state
government agencies.35  Y2k preparation spurred many organizations to
operationalize strategies for backing up data, enabling remote working, and
enhancing communication links between organizations, employees, customers, and
vendors.36  Many tenants of the World Trade Center also cited the 1993 bombing of
the building as their rationale for having developed extensive disaster recovery plans,
which they, in turn, attributed to their success in evacuating employees and
preserving vital data.37
The amount of time and resources spent on information technology disaster
planning can vary with the size and type of organization.  According to the Gartner
Group, a research and advisory firm, an average company allocates approximately
three percent of its annual information technology budget to disaster recovery.  In
contrast, financial services companies, which have to meet requirements set by the
Federal Reserve Board and/or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
spend an average of seven to eight percent.38
However, if it may seem costly to dedicate a significant portion of one’s budget
to planning for an event with a low chance of occurring, the financial consequences
for being unprepared can be even higher.  In the case of financial companies, many,
if not most, had invested in data backup and disaster recovery facilities to one degree
or another.  While this allowed them to save a significant amount of customer and
business-critical data, it is estimated that these firms will still spend $3-5 billion over
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the next two years to replace their destroyed information technology infrastructure.39
For example, Dow Jones Inc., a global financial news company and publisher of The
Wall Street Journal and Barron’s publications, was expected to spend $2 million to
replace information technology hardware and office equipment.40  Although it had
relatively few offices in or around the World Trade Center and a portion of the
affected area of the Pentagon was not occupied, the federal government will also be
spending a significant amount to replace lost and damaged information technology
systems.  Input, a Web-based information technology market research and marketing
services firm, predicted that the federal government will spend $75 million, with the
Customs Service alone expected to account for $15 million of that amount.41
While information technology disaster recovery planning is often compared to
the preparations for Y2k, it is important to recognize that these scenarios are
qualitatively different.  Y2k had a finite time line with a clear indicator of success or
failure.  In contrast, the war on terrorism appears to be an open-ended and evolving
process.  As the examples below demonstrate, measures of success are relative, and
the task of planning is never truly done.  The lessons learned today can help prepare
for tomorrow, but they do not represent the final word on information technology
disaster recovery planning.
Lessons Regarding Continuity and Recovery
Planning and Practices
The events of September 11, 2001, have brought a new urgency to continuity
and recovery planning and practices.  While attention has been growing over time,
this multifaceted undertaking can often be a very challenging and frustrating process
as planners try to coordinate disparate parts of their organizations while trying to
strike a balance between how much they cannot afford to be unprepared and how
much they can afford to spend on resources they may never use.  Further
complicating matters has been the tendency for organizations to “stovepipe” the
different protections relevant to information technology disaster recovery planning.
For example, information security has often been handled independently from
physical security.  Similarly, the compartmentalization of an organization’s units and
processes can contribute to a fractured planning process that can leave an
organization vulnerable.42
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One reported example indicating the possible costs and consequences when an
organization does not have a fully integrated plan is the May Davis Group.  The
privately held financial services company had its offices on the 87th floor of one of
the World Trade Center towers.  In addition to losing $100,000 of equipment, the
firm apparently lost some regulatory documents and $1 million in revenue due to data
loss and downtime.43
A less severe example is the Secret Service field office, located in 7 World
Trade Center, which did have a contingency plan, but had not fully implemented it
at the time of the attack.  The agency’s field office was able to resume operations the
following day at an alternative location.  It reportedly lost some of the information
it was collecting on criminal suspects.44
Another example is Deloitte Consulting, whose primary telecommunications
hub in New York City, located in the World Financial Center next to the World
Trade Center towers, was put out of service, affecting an estimated one thousand
employees in the area.  As a consulting firm, Deloitte considers its ability to share
information with clients to be its core business.  During the weeks it took to rebuild
its land line communication center, Deloitte’s New York area employees used cell
phones to stay in contact with customers and fellow employees.45  
Even organizations that have planned extensively can sometimes overlook small
details that appear insignificant, but later prove to be important.  One such example
is American International Group (AIG) Inc.  The financial services company has
offices and information technology operations near the World Trade Center site.
Using its backup business center in Parsippany, NJ, and a second previously
contracted emergency facility in Livingston, NJ, AIG was able to use data from its
automated backup system to be operational the day after the attacks.  However, not
all of its servers were part of the automated backup system, and the backup tapes for
these servers reportedly were left behind when its building was evacuated.46
Augment Disaster Recovery Plans
 
In many respects, the September 11, 2001, attacks established a new standard
for disaster recovery plans  –  the complete destruction and loss of a building.  Even
among some of the most prepared organizations, their plans sometimes presumed the
ability to eventually return to their offices, even if only to retrieve equipment and
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paper files.47  Modern fire safety and construction methods have largely made the
possibility of a building collapse less likely, so many organizations developed plans
that focused on the movement of data to be used temporarily at a backup facility.
These same businesses and agencies must now consider whether to augment their
disaster recovery plans to include the movement of people, the rapid acquisition of
equipment and furniture, network connectivity, adequate workspace, and more.
Some organizations may need to be able to not just store, but also to run mission
critical applications, at their backup sites, and staff may need to be trained to
implement such a plan.48  The possible need for more sophisticated data backup
facilities suggests organizations may consider establishing a ‘hot site’.  A hot site is
a facility that has all of the data, equipment, software, connectivity, furniture, and
office space assembled and ready to use so that an organization can continue its
computer operations uninterrupted in the event of a disaster.  In some cases,
organizations will mirror their data directly to the hot site as an additional backup or
in lieu of using backup tapes at the primary site.  While hot sites provide the greatest
amount of redundancy and readiness, the cost of establishing and maintaining such
a site can cost millions of dollars, with additional yearly maintenance costs.49  This
raises cost effectiveness issues.  Some hot sites, however, might serve a dual purpose,
such as a secondary data site or as part of a comprehensive backup system.50
Organizations with more detailed recovery plans were often able to respond
better to the events of September 11, 2001.  In the case of the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA), the 21-member office had a contingency plan
for its contingency plan.  After evacuating, the OSHA employees discovered their
first designated meeting site was inaccessible, so they regrouped at a nearby regional
office.  After this office was evacuated, they gathered at a third site to implement
their plan to provide advice and technical assistance to businesses and agencies in an
effort to protect workers from being exposed to hazardous substances and other
safety risks at ground zero.51  
A second example is the New York Board of Trade (NYBOT), which handles
trading for commodities such as coffee, sugar, and orange juice.  NYBOT had
invested in a hot site in Queens, NY, which included limited space for a reduced
number of trading pits.  According to one report, NYBOT had invested $1.75 million
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to establish the facility, which cost an additional $300,000 per year to maintain.
However, while an extended outage would have resulted in the rapid loss of trading
contracts to other exchanges in the United States and abroad, NYBOT’s investment
paid off, allowing it to resume modified trading operations one day after the attacks.52
A corollary to this lesson learned is the need to assure that recovery procedures
are well documented and safeguarded .  Employees need to be well-informed and
practiced for the responsibilities they are expected to carry out.  Correspondingly, just
as one would not keep the sole backup tapes of important information at the primary
data center in which they were created, a prudent step would be to keep one or more
copies of the recovery plans available at the appropriate off-site locations.
Backing Up Data and Backing Up Applications
A second lesson learned that is related to continuity and disaster planning and
practices is the need to have a comprehensive backup system that captures more than
just an organization’s data files.  As discussed above, most of the financial services
firms in or near the World Trade Center had comprehensive data management and
recovery systems in place.  Some highly automated systems will begin backing up
data to a remote center when a significant temperature change or power loss in the
building is detected.53  Cantor Fitzgerald, one of the hardest hit financial services
companies, losing 733 of its approximately 1,000 World Trade Center employees,
including 150 information technology workers, lost none of its data due to a system
that mirrored all of its software and data to its data center in Rochelle Park, NJ.54  In
contrast, the U.S. Customs Service was not as well prepared.  In addition to
experiencing difficulties finding alternative office space for its 800 displaced
employees, the office located in the World Trade Center complex did not have all of
its files backed up to computers in its Washington, DC, headquarters.  Several
months after the attack, the Customs Service reportedly was still working to re-create
some of its files from scratch while others are considered permanently lost.55
In addition to backing up data, organizations also need to backup the data
catalogs, directories, and software applications used with the data.  Organizations that
saved only their raw data had to spend a significant amount of time re-creating their
applications, organizing the data, and reestablishing user permissions to access the
data.56  One company that apparently experienced this problem was NYBOT.
CRS-14
57Jaikumar Vijayan, “Sept. 11 Attacks Prompt Decentralization Moves,” Computerworld,
17 December 2001, 
[http://www.computerworld.com/storyba/0,4125,NAV47_STO66660,00.html];  Carol Sliwa,
“New York Board of Trade Gets Back to Business,”   Computerworld, 24 September 2001.
58Stan Gibson, “Rethinking Storage,” 15 October 2001, eWeek, p.1.
59Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, “A Slow-Moving Industry Picks Up Speed,”
InformationWeek, 21 January 2002, p.33.
Despite its extensive hot site contingency plan, NYBOT lost some financial records,
applications, and e-mail files that were not backed up to the site.  Some of this
information was backed up to tapes, but the tapes were stored in a fireproof safe kept
in their World Trade Center tower office.57
In addition to taking a broader view of the digital tools and assets to backup and
preserve, organizations – such as regulatory agencies and insurance companies –  that
still rely heavily on paper files may wish to consider digitizing some of their
documents as they are received.  Despite much touting of the so-called paperless
office, the blizzard of paper that accompanied the dust and debris with the collapse
of the towers suggests many organizations are still heavily dependent on their
physical documents.  However, the high cost of digital imaging requires companies
and agencies to consider carefully which documents are most critical and often used.
One company that did have a comprehensive digital imaging system in place
before September 11, 2001, was Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield.  Developed over the
past ten years, starting with claims forms, the insurance carrier’s optical storage
system captures almost all of its paper documents.  As a result, the company lost only
about two days’ worth of paper mail.58
One company that decided to accelerate its plans to digitize and automate its
paper-based information is Kemper Casualty Company, which had offices on the 35th
and 36th floors of One World Trade Center.  The Kemper data backup system had all
but the previous day’s and that morning’s data backed up on tape at its headquarters.
It was also able to re-create the lost transactions for the missing data.  However,
according to media reports, Kemper lost thousands of paper documents, including
innumerable insurance policy applications.  The company had to spend a significant
amount of time and resources to re-create the information by going back to customers
and Kemper agents.59 
The Securities and Exchange Commission, whose New York regional office
was located in 7 World Trade Center, also did not digitize its paper records.  While
the regulatory agency did have a significant amount of its data and files backed up
electronically, case files that took years to compile, informal notes written down from
interviews and analysis, and other documents were lost.  Some of these lost records
reportedly were part of pending cases, including those related to investigations of
insider trading and financial fraud.  While the SEC can have parties submit new
copies of documents previously provided, and it may be able to obtain some
documents from agencies conducting parallel investigations, documents and other
evidence from older cases and smaller companies that are not in operation any longer
CRS-15
60David S. Hilzenrath, “SEC Papers Lost in N.Y. Attacks,” Washington Post, 13 September
2001, p.E3; Reed Abelson, “S.E.C. Needs a New Home, Fast,”  New York Times, 28
September 2001, [http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/28/business/28SEC.html].
61Eric Chabrow, and Martin J. Garvey, “Playing for Keeps,”  InformationWeek, 26
November 2001, p.39.
62Maggie Semilof, “Hackers, Not Terrorists, Major Concern,” InternetWeek, 1 October
2001, p.11.
may be difficult to recover.  The loss and reconstruction of the files may slow down
the progress of some investigations and possibly result in others being discontinued.60
A corollary to the lessons learned regarding comprehensive data storage plans
is the need to fully and regularly test backup sites and media.  Organizations that rely
on ‘cold sites’ – backup sites that are not always in use and may require the
organization to install hardware, software, or load data to become functional  –   in
the event of a disaster, could experience further problems if they discover their tapes
are corrupted or equipment does not work.  One organization that regularly tested its
backup systems and information was NYBOT.  The exchange tested its backup site
monthly and practiced its recovery plan every 60 days to assure its systems were
working and its employees were familiar with the procedures.61
Lessons Regarding Decentralization
A second major category of lessons learned concerns the decentralization of
operations and the effectiveness of distributed communications.  The rise of
networked computing and the Internet has provided the opportunity to connect far-
flung locations around the country and the world.  Many public and private sector
organizations have used this technology to reach outward to new markets, deliver
new services, and reduce communications costs.  However, the lessons learned
discussed below suggest there is also a need for organizations to turn this technology
inward to reduce the vulnerabilities of internal operations and to strengthen
communications links with internal, as well as external, constituencies.
Decentralize Operations
The maxim, ‘don’t put all of your eggs in one basket,’ can be applied to a
variety of situations: college applications, job searches, and investment portfolios.
It can also be applied to the structure and location of an organization’s operations.
Although many of the tenants and neighbors of the World Trade Center had backup
facilities, some of these facilities were located within a few blocks of their primary
location, resulting in the loss, or at least the inaccessibility, of data at both sites when
it was needed most.  According to some industry experts, recovery sites should be
located at least 20-50 miles way from the primary data center.  In addition, some
observers suggest that human resources should also be located in more than one spot
to reduce the potential for losing a significant portion of one’s workforce in a single
event.62  
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As was mentioned above, Cantor Fitzgerald lost 733 of its employees, including
150 of its information technology workers.  However, despite this devastating loss,
the firm was able to continue its operations in part by relying on employees in its
other offices to assume some of the responsibilities of its World Trade Center
office.63  Another company that benefitted from decentralization was Blackwood
Trading LLC.  The brokerage firm’s offices were located six blocks from the World
Trade Center, part of the area that lost power and communications service, but it
mirrored all of its data at a remote site in Jersey City, NJ. It purposely chose a site
physically distant from its offices to reduce the chance of a complete loss of data in
the event of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster.64 
Since September 11, 2001, several other firms have decided to heed the
decentralization lesson.  One of those organizations is Dow Jones.  It had maintained
offices at One World Financial Center, adjacent to the World Trade Center, which
served as a hub for 800 employees and its data production center.  While the damage
to the building was not significant enough to prevent its eventual repair and
reoccupation, the damage did render approximately 100 servers, 400 workstations,
and an estimated “millions of dollars” of the company’s networking equipment
inoperable.  As part of its new strategy to reduce its vulnerability, Dow Jones
reportedly decided to permanently move the company’s data center to its backup
facilities in South Brunswick, NJ, and move only half of its employees back to its
Manhattan location.  The financial information company plans to rely on a network
of news and data centers distributed around the country.  It will also rely more
heavily on remote offices, encourage telecommuting, and establish a new backup
facility distant from its South Brunswick data center.65
Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, which benefitted significantly from its
extensive backup system, has also decided to decentralize the 1,900 employees from
its World Trade Center offices into three different facilities.  In addition to spreading
the risk, the insurance carrier also observed that it is easier to conduct a data recovery
operation for a smaller portion of its operations as compared to the larger whole in
the event of a disaster.66
Ensure the Ability to Communicate with Internal and External
Constituencies
Another lesson learned related to decentralization is the need to ensure the
ability to communicate with internal and external constituencies in the event of an
emergency. The attacks of September 11, 2001, forced many companies to rely on
ad hoc networks to communicate with employees.  The overload of
telecommunications networks, including cellular voice networks, left many people
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scrambling to find a way to get messages out.   Some have suggested relying on
wireless data backup systems as an alternative to voice networks in the case of an
emergency.  One such network that proved useful for many people is a data network,
which is used to support the BlackBerry pager, a mobile e-mail and paging device.67
In the weeks following the attacks, the Committee on House Administration
supplied BlackBerry devices and monthly service to all 435 Members.68  Demand for
BlackBerry pager devices by other federal agencies has jumped dramatically since
September 11, 2001.69
Most organizations are aware of the importance of communications with
external constituencies: citizens and customers.  In the case of government agencies,
this function is becoming associated with electronic government.  Many people
searching for information and guidance during the uncertainty that followed the
attacks turned to corporate and agency Web sites.  However, the performance of these
sites was mixed. Some sites immediately transformed themselves into centers for
crisis information, while others were shut down altogether.  The Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) initially shut down its Web site citing cyber attack concerns.
The site was brought back online late in the afternoon of September 11, 2001, with
the announcement that agencies in Washington, DC would be open the next day.70
The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) Web site was also offline for a
significant portion of the day.71  
The Department of Defense used its DefenseLink site to provide information
and pictures about the attack on the Pentagon. DefenseLink, the Defense
Department’s main Web site, experienced a 243% increase in page hits the week
following the attacks.  In order to handle the increased traffic, DoD tripled the sites’
bandwidth capacity.  Other sites that experienced surges in Web traffic included the
FBI, the Department of Justice, and FirstGov.
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FEMA regularly updated its Web site with information.  The number of visitors
to the FEMA site demonstrates the expectations of citizens to be able to find
information online.  FEMA normally has 500,000 visitors to its site every day.  On
September 11, 2001, that number soared to 2.3 million.  FirstGov was a bit slower
in responding, but, by late in the day of September 12, had cobbled together a page
providing links to information from a variety of federal, state, and local agencies, as
well as non-governmental organizations helping with the crisis.  The FBI established
a special site to collect tips about the terrorists.  Of the 80,000 tips reportedly
received within the first five days of the attack, more than half, or 47,052, were
received via the Web site.72  Following the anthrax incidents, the Centers for Disease
Control Web site also experienced a notable increase in visitors.73
Lessons Regarding Redundancy and Planning of
Communications
The third category of lessons learned involves the institutionalization of
redundancy in information infrastructures.  Redundancy, as used here, includes
having computer or network system components, including hardware, software, and
telecommunications links, installed and ready to use as a backup in the event primary
resources fail.  A related aspect of redundancy is the ability to replace and/or
reconstruct hardware and software quickly and easily when necessary to prevent
extended periods of downtime.
Employment of Redundant Service Providers
Redundancy, or the lack thereof, proved to be critical to many agencies and
businesses in lower Manhattan.  As described earlier, most of the area’s
telecommunications lines were connected through two primary switching stations,
one of which was destroyed and the other rendered useless due to a lack of electricity.
Some organizations that thought they had redundant connections by contracting with
two different service providers discovered that both providers used the same central
switching office, leaving the organization without service.  Approximately 40 of the
competitive local exchange carriers in the area relied on Verizon’s 140 West Street
facility to provide their services.74 
One group of businesses that did not lose access to their data networks were the
tenants of the New York Information Technology Center, an office building located
at 55 Broad Street in Manhattan, six blocks from the World Trade Center.  Among
the services provided by the building’s management company is a full
telecommunications infrastructure served by 14 voice and data carriers.  As a result,
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it was reported that none of the tenants lost access to their data networks, and the few
tenants who did use Verizon’s voice services were able to switch to another of the
building’s providers within 24 hours.75
Two other companies that had redundant networks were Lehman Brothers and
Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield.  Lehman Brothers, which had offices both in and
around the World Trade Center, had fully redundant networks in Manhattan and in
Jersey City, NJ, along with duplicative wide-area links that kept all 45 of its branches
connected.76   Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, whose backup system was referred to
earlier, also had multiple voice and data carriers that connected its World Trade
Center offices to its redundant data centers outside of Manhattan, which allowed the
insurance carrier to continue to serve its 4.5 million customers.77  Once its new
building in Brooklyn is completed, the insurance carrier plans to install satellite
receivers on the roof so it can transmit data between facilities worldwide.  In addition
to being a less expensive alternative to using several high speed land lines, the
satellite receivers will also enable the company to continue to transmit data in the
event that the city’s land line infrastructure experiences a disruption.78
Use of Generic Replaceable Technology
  
A related lesson that some organizations have cited as valuable to their ability
to rebuild their systems quickly is the use of generic, replaceable technology.
Agencies and financial firms faced with the need to rebuild their systems quickly  -–
in some cases, in a matter of days  –-  received a significant amount of support from
many of the major technology vendors, including, but not limited to, Compaq, Dell,
IBM, and Sun Microsystems.  Drawing from their existing stock of equipment, and
ramping up production, the vendors were able to supply large amounts of equipment
on short notice.  Several information technology companies donated equipment and
services to federal agencies in Virginia and New York to assist with recovery
efforts.79  Many vendors also provided discounts, sometimes as high as 80%, for their
commercial clients.80   Vendor support also came in the form of emergency help desk
support, cross-country equipment deliveries, and on-site technical support.  For
example, IBM helped Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield replace over 2,200 desktops
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and 413 laptops, while Compaq replaced the insurance carrier’s 256 servers.81  Dell
and Compaq also provided the American Red Cross with desktops, laptops, servers,
and other equipment to assist with the relief efforts.82  Based on the experience of
September 11, 2001, the ability to replace equipment quickly with easy-to-find
products that do not require significant customization is likely to be one of the factors
affecting organizations’ future continuity and disaster recovery planning decisions.
Future Considerations
Although there are undoubtedly additional lessons learned from the September
11, 2001 attacks, the lessons highlighted in the previous pages provide a broad sense
of the breadth and depth of the issues facing public and private sector organizations.
While not all-inclusive, they emphasize three general approaches: the establishment
and practice of comprehensive continuity and recovery plans, the decentralization of
operations, and the development of system redundancies to eliminate single points
of weakness.  The lessons learned from September 11, 2001 build, in part, upon the
lessons learned from the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the preparation for
the Y2k transition.  However, as agencies and businesses move ahead with continuity
planning and implementation, there are indicators that the character of this
preparation is changing.
Emphasis on Business Continuity Over Disaster Recovery
One change is that the new lessons learned appear to represent the shift to a
higher standard of continuity and disaster recovery planning.83  Comprehensive
contingency plans, perhaps once viewed, at the least, as optional and, at the most, as
a prudent measure, may now be seen as an integral part of developing and
maintaining an organization’s information technology infrastructure.  Once
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considered a remote possibility, the permanent loss of a facility, while still unlikely,
must now be taken more seriously.  Consequently, an increasing number of
organizations, including small and mid-sized companies who often have more limited
resources, have begun to focus not just on disaster recovery, but on business
continuity.  In a networked economy, the costs of network downtime can be
measured in tens of thousands of dollars per hour, and as high as one million dollars
per hour for highly technology-dependent entities such as infrastructure services
firms and energy companies.84  Other concerns, such as the loss of electricity, the
increased frequency of computer viruses, and high-profile hacking attempts have also
spurred many organizations to focus on comprehensive business continuity planning
rather than disaster recovery alone.85  
In addition to these higher standards, there is also greater recognition of the
qualitative change in preparation.  Whereas some organizations may have felt their
Y2k readiness measures provided adequate protection, there is now a greater
realization that continuity and disaster recovery planning is an open-ended and
evolving process, requiring reinforced and redundant infrastructures, regular practice
exercises, and testing of data backups and systems.  For example, the Pentagon,
which already had contingency plans in place, has since embarked on its Command
Communications Survivability Project in an effort to redesign its information
technology contingency plans.86  In Congress, Senator Ted Stevens introduced an
amendment (SA 2450) to the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L.
107-117) on December 7, 2001 that would have required agencies to have “redundant
and physically separate” telecommunications systems in an attempt to maintain the
operability of communications of government offices in the event of an attack or
catastrophe.  The amendment passed on a voice vote in the Senate but did not  pass
in the House of Representatives.87
Information Sharing and Collaboration
Another change is the potential for increased information sharing between
federal, state, and local government, as well as between the public and private
sectors.  While information sharing figures prominently in plans for law
enforcement-related homeland security activities, it also may play an important role
in continuity planning and critical information infrastructure protection.  For
example, the Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council, which serves as an
interagency forum for the CIOs of thirty federal departments and agencies, decided
to include a representative from the National Association of State Chief Information
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Officers (NASCIO) in its activities.  In addition to collaborating on issues such as
interoperability in wireless communications and electronic government initiatives,
several state CIOs are working with the Office of Homeland Security on efforts to
protect against terrorism.88
Another example is Operation Dark Screen, initiated by Representative Ciro
Rodriguez.89  The three-phase exercise will be conducted over several months during
2002 and 2003 as a partnership between federal, state, and local government, and the
private sector.  It is designed to test the partners’ preparedness to protect critical
infrastructures from cyberattacks.  There are plans to conduct both a tabletop and a
live exercise, as well as an opportunity to implement new protections based on the
outcomes of the exercises.  As activities such as Operation Dark Screen are carried
out, and organizations continue to rebuild and reinforce their information technology
assets, it is anticipated that further lessons learned will be added, providing a fuller
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